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Abstract (142 words) 
 
 
When green parties emerged in the 1970s and 1980s, their political project included a 
strong commitment to a new type of internal party organisation, giving power to the 
µJUDVVURRWV¶. With Green parties having become well-established in most West European 
party systems, hDVWKHYLVLRQRIµJUDVVURRWV democracy¶VXUYLYHGthe party foundation 
stage? What drives the ongoing or waning commitment to grassroots democracy?  
Analysing party membership survey data from 15 parties collected in the early 2000s when 
many green parties had for the first time become involved in national government, we find 
that it is the social movement oriented, pacifist, left-wing membership that is most 
committed to grassroots democracy. It is the current involvement in social movements 
rather than past activity that is most important. Support for grassroots democracy is also 
stronger in ³/DWLQ(XURSH´DQG*UHHFHbut weaker in parties which have become 
established in parliament and government.  
 3 
Introduction1 
 
The study of intra-party democracy has been one of the perennial themes of the political 
sociology of political parties. After the classical studies of Ostrogorski (1902) and Michels 
(1911), however, the achievement of internal party democracy seemed to constitute a 
utopian dream. Later analyses went further claiming a contradiction between internal party 
GHPRFUDF\DQGDSDUW\¶VSROLWLFDOHIIHFWLYHQHVV'XYHUJHUSDQGHYHQDQ
incompatibility with democratic government (McKenzie 1982, p. 195).  
 
This academic rejection of the concept of internal party democracy has more recently 
given way to a growing literature that examines a range of organisational features 
empirically (cf. Poguntke et al. 2016). The starting point for this renewed interest in 
questions of party organisation appears to have been the introduction of plebiscitary 
elements in some Western European parties in the 1990s (Scarrow 1999; Seyd 1999). 
While the exact implications of these recent reforms for the nature of party democracy are 
still to unravel, they follow on from an earlier development to challenge the dominant 
philosophy of party organisation which has not attracted a lot of systematic attention:  the 
DWWHPSWWRLQWURGXFHµJUDVVURRWVGHPRFUDF\¶LQJUHHQSDUWLHV 
 
More than any other parties, green parties have been associated with the endeavour to 
relaunch the idea of internal party democracy. Rejection of established parties and their 
way of operating was an essential part of the political context in which green parties 
emerged in the 1970s and 1980s.  The new parties sought to put into practice an idea 
borrowed from the agenda of the new social movements. The hierarchical nature of 
established parties and their non-responsiveness to demands made by ordinary citizens 
 4 
LQFOXGLQJSDUW\PHPEHUVKDGWREHRYHUFRPHE\FUHDWLQJDµQHZW\SHRISROLWLFV¶)RUWKH
QHZJUHHQSDUWLHVWKLVPHDQWWKHLQWURGXFWLRQRIµgrassroots democracy¶, with the 
emphasis on giving power to ordinary members rather than party leaders or a party elite.  
 
7KHLUDWWHPSWWRFUHDWHDµQHZSROLWLFV¶ZLWKDFRPPLWPHQWWRSDUWLFLSDWRU\GHPRFUDF\DQG
rejection of traditional party politics attracted some considerable attention in the 1980s 
when green parties first managed to enter national parliaments in most West European 
countries. The concept of grassroots democracy was arguably not well defined. It was, first 
of all, a rejection of established party politics, and how exactly to give power to the 
µJUDVVURRWV¶UHPDLQHGDQLVVXHRIFRQWHQWLRQZLWKLQJUHHQSDUWLHV(cf. Heinrich 1993; 
Sarkar 1994). 1HZFRQFHSWVVXFKDVWKHµURWDWLRQ¶RISXEOLFRIILFHVDQGWHUPOLPLWDWLRQVIRU
party positions were introduced. Holding public and party offices was widely seen as 
incompatible. Perhaps most visibly, green parties rejected the hierarchical nature of 
HVWDEOLVKHGSDUWLHVDQGWKHFRQFHSWRIµSDUW\OHDGHUVKLS¶RSWLQJLQVWHDGIRUGHFLVLRQVWREH
PDGHE\WKHµJUDVVURRWV¶DQGDFROOHFWLYHDSSURDFKRIUHSUHVHQWLQJWKHSDUW\WRWKHRXWVLGH
world. While some early ideas, such as a the µURWDWLRQ¶RIRIILFHVZHUHIDLUO\TXLFNO\
abandoned and many green parties went through a number of organisational reforms, the 
agenda of giving the grassroots a significant role was generally retained, giving 
FRQWHPSRUDU\JUHHQSDUWLHVDµGLVWLQFWLYHRUJDQLVDWLRQDOVW\OH¶5LKRX[ 
 
Two broad interpretations of the grassroots democracy phenomenon in green parties have 
emerged. The first is influenced by the idea of political parties following a standard 
development path of parties which was first outlined by Robert Michels (1911) and later 
became a key element of other classical theories, for example 3DQHELDQFR¶VWKHRU\RISDUW\
institutionalisation (Panebianco 1988). This strand of argument sees green parties  passing 
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through different development passes that eventually will see them, or at least the 
successful green parties, embracing essentially the same organisational principles and 
practices that established parties have adopted:LWKWKHµVRFLDOPRYHPHQW¶FKDUDFWHURI
green parties disappearing and having to meet the demands of parliamentary politics, and 
more recently, of governmental participation, green parties are seen as forced to re-
RUJDQLVHRUµPRGHUQLVH¶WKHLULQWHUQDOVWUXFWXUHVLIWKH\ZDQWWRVXUYLYHUHTXLULQJD
rejection of major elements of grassroots democracy.  In the literature of green parties,  the 
QHHGIRUJUHHQSDUWLHVWRIROORZVXFKDSDWKDQGµPRGHUQLVH¶KDVEHHQstrongly articulated 
in national case studies, in particular of the German Greens (e.g. Raschke 2001; Bukow 
and Rammelt 2003; Blühdorn and Szarka 2004).  
 
The alternative view challenges such a linear model that ties specific organisational 
principles to particular development phases. Comparative studies of the development of 
green party organisation have shed doubts on the view that parliamentary and 
governmental responsibilities are intrinsically linked to specific organisational reforms 
5LKRX[7KLVZRXOGVXJJHVWDµSDUW\IDPLO\¶0DLUDQG0XGGHPRGHORI
green party organisation. While this leaves open the possibility that grassroots democracy 
is not just a characteristic of the early development of green parties but will survive as an 
essential element of green political identity, it raises the question of how embedded the 
concept of grassroots democracy is within green parties.  
 
Most previous studies of green party organisations have focused on the analysis of party 
debates and observed changes over time as well as differences between countries (Rihoux 
2001, 2006, 2016; Burchell 2001, 2002; Frankland et al. 2008; Miragliotta 2015). One 
aspect that has not been studied recently is the views of green party members on questions 
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of green party organisations. Within the empirical literature on party members, the analysis 
RIPHPEHUV¶DWWLWXGHVWRVpecific organisational principles is relatively rare (but cf. Young 
and Cross 2002; Hansen and Saglie 2005). For green parties, party members are obviously 
crucial for any concept of grassroots democracy. We seek to explore to what extent 
grassroots democracy is supported by party members and what factors determine attitudes 
to internal party democracy in green parties. 
 
+HUEHUW.LWVFKHOW¶VSDWK-breaking work on the internal dynamics of the German and 
Belgian green parties in the 1980s, based on extensive interviews as well as membership 
surveys, is an obvious starting point for such an endeavour (Kitschelt 1988, 1989, 1990; 
Kitschelt and Hellemans 1990).  The field work for these studies was undertaken some 
time ago in the early years of green party development.  Since then, many green parties in 
Western Europe have established themselves in the political system. Looking at the 
organisational level of green parties, the main changes involving a certain movement away 
from some of the more extreme elements of grassroots democracy could be observed 
during the late 1980s and 1990s (Rihoux 2001).  Between the early 2000s and the present, 
there have been some incremental changes but key elements of the internal structure of 
green parties remain in place and questions of party organisation have not dominated 
internal party debate to the extent this could be observed in earlier years (Rihoux 2016).  
 
Apart from exploring the sources of support for grassroots principles at the individual 
level, a key question is the impact of contextual factors.  One might expect that certain 
aspects of political socialization and values held would increase the potential of support for 
grassroots democracy, but it is uncertain whether this applies to the same degree depending 
on the kind of political context in which green parties find themselves. In particular, we 
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have to ask whether it makes a difference whether a party is at the margins of politics or 
has risen to political relevance. Also from that perspective, the timing of the survey is 
particularly useful. By the early 2000s, there was some considerable variation in the 
development stages reached by green parties. Some green parties, for example in Greece 
and Norway, were extremely marginal and were not seen as having a realistic chance of 
winning parliamentary representation at national level. At the other extreme, several green 
parties had for the first time entered coalition government at national level in the late 
1990s. This provides a unique opportunity to test for the import of development stages.  
 
 
This paper seeks to contribute to the study of intra-party democracy by analysing the 
attitudes of green party members to grassroots democracy in the early 2000s. The chief 
data source for this study is an extensive comparative survey of green party members, 
covering 18 parties in 15 countries, undertaken in 2002 and 2003.2  
 
 
Theory and Hypotheses 
 
The historical analyses of the formation and early development of green parties identify a 
range of pertinent factors that led to these parties taking up grassroots democracy: these 
ZHUHSDUWLHVHPHUJLQJIURPWKHµQHZ¶VRFLDOPRYHPHQWVRIWKHVVDQGV
ZLWKDFRQVWLWXHQF\VWURQJO\LQIOXHQFHGE\WKHYDOXHVRIWKHµ1HZ/HIW¶HJ0OOHU-
Rommel 1989; Parkin 1989; Richardson and Rootes 19952¶1HLOO).  While there are 
many political factors that contributed to green parties placing a strong emphasis on a 
UHMHFWLRQRISDUW\KLHUDUFK\DQGWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRIDµWUXO\¶GHPRFUDWLFSDUW\WKH
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influence of the experience of the µQHZVRFLDOPRYHPHQWV¶LQFRQMXQFWLRQZLWKD
µOLEHUWDULDQ¶OHIWRXWORRNZLWKLQDEURDGO\µDQDUFKLVW¶IUDPHZRUNSOD\HGDGRPLQDQWUROH
(Kitschelt 1988, p. 129, p. 134; Doherty and Geus 1996, p. 5; Hay 2002, pp. 277-282).  
 
This would lead us to expect, first, that Green Party members who have been active in 
µQHZVRFLDOPRYHPHQWV¶VKRXOGEHPRUHVXSSRUWLYHRIJUDVVURRWVGHPRFUDF\WKDQWKRVH
without such an experience.  The effect could be expected to be stronger among members 
who were engaged in social movement activity at the time of the survey. The anti-
globalisation movement was arguably the main contemporary social movement at the time 
which had a strong anti-hierarchical, anarchist ideology (el-Ojeili 2014), which might thus 
particularly lend itself to views sympathetic to grassroots  democracy.   
 
 
H1.  Members with a strong past involvement in social movements are more supportive of 
grassroots democracy.  
 
H2. Members who are currently involved in social movement activity are more likely to 
support grassroots democracy. 
 
Moving on to questions of political attitudes, the literature referred to would suggest that 
Green Party members embracing PRUHµOHIW-ZLQJ¶SROLWLFDOYLHZVVKRXOGEHPRUH
amenable to the ideas of grassroots democracy.  Furthermore, one might expect members 
who continue to support the key demands of the new social movements most closely 
associated with green parties during their foundation phase to be more supportive of 
grassroots democracy. We have a range of possible variables to consider here, 3 but we 
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chose to concentrate on two key indicators important for green politics in the early 1980s: 
left-wing attitudes and pacifism. 
 
H3. 0HPEHUVDOLJQHGZLWKWKHµ/HIW¶DUHPRUHOLNHO\WRVXSSRUWJUDVVURRWVGHPRFUDF\ 
 
H4. Members with strong pacifist views are more likely to support grassroots democracy. 
 
 
,IZHIROORZ.LWVFKHOW¶VZULWLQJVon the German and Belgian green parties in the 1980s 
(Kitschelt 1989; Kitschelt and Hellemans 1990), then activists with a strong commitment 
to grassroots democracy should be those restricting their activity to party activity, taking 
OLWWOHRUQRLQWHUHVWLQREWDLQLQJSXEOLFRIILFH3DUW\µEXV\ERGLHV¶NQRZWKHUXOHVRIWKH
game best and can use them to their advantage, which often means trying to challenge the 
dominance of parliamentary parties and reasserting the rights of party activists to keep 
office holders under control. Holders of public office, on the other hand, could be expected 
to be more sceptical about grassroots democracy as its use undermines rather than supports 
their position. 
 
 
H5. Party office holders are more likely to support grassroots democracy principles while 
public office holders are more likely to oppose them. 
 
 
Having looked at these individual-level determinants of support for grassroots democracy, 
we finally turn to the possible impact of contextual factors. One major reference point is 
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the theory of a standard development path as advanced by Michels (1911) and Panebianco 
(1988). We use the party life-span model first developed by Pedersen (1982, 1991) to 
distinguish between distinct phases of party development determined by thresholds they 
have to overcome (cf. also Müller-Rommel 2002). Different thresholds might make 
different types of demand on parties. At first, parties have to generate public support in 
order to register and make it onto the ballot paper; forming broad coalitions of people 
willing to support the party is here crucial. Once a party is formally constituted and 
admitted to the electoral process, the party will want to take the next threshold, that of 
electoral representation.  Once this threshold is taken, the focus of the party should switch 
to the participation in the political process; the parliamentary party is likely to become an 
LPSRUWDQWIRFXV0DNLQJDQHIIRUWWREHFRPHµUHOHYDQW¶LQWHUPVRIJRYHUQPHQWIRUPDWLRQ
may be a turning point as the focus of the party may switch from membership mobilisation 
and representation to being represented in the media in a certain way to underline its 
suitability as a coalition partner; this having been successfully accomplished, the actual 
joining of a government coalition is likely to impose further burdens on the party as 
FRPSURPLVHVWRVWD\LQSRZHUKDYHWREHµVROG¶WRWKHSDUW\DQGWKHPHPEHUVKLSDWODUJH 
 
What we might expect is that the more advanced a green party is along this path, the less 
likely party members are interested in maintaining principles of grassroots democracy. 
Instead, the party should become dominated by the need to attract electoral support and to 
achieve and maintain credibility as a partner in government. ,Q.LWVFKHOW¶VWHUPLQRORJ\WKH
focus of green parties should change from a µlogic of FRQVWLWXHQF\UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ¶ to a 
µORJLFRISDUW\FRPSHWLWLRQ¶.LWVFKHOWSThe pressures of parliamentary and 
governmental politics should provide a greater challenge to green party members to 
confront their traditional commitment to grassroots democracy, strengthening views that 
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JUHHQSDUWLHVKDYHWRµPRGHUQLVH¶LQRUGHUWREHPRUHHIIHFWLYHLQWHUPVRIHOHFWRUDO
competition and being considered a trustworthy partner in government.  
 
H6. The further a green party has progressed along the party µOLIHVSDQ¶PRGHOWKHORZHU
the support for grassroots democracy.  
 
Data and Methodology 
 
The analysis presented in this paper is based on a unique set of comparative data that has 
EHHQFROOHFWHGE\WKHµ(XURSHDQ*UHHQ3DUW\0HPEHUVKLS¶SURMHFWIXQded by the British 
Academy.4 A research group with members in most West European countries met for the 
first time in 2001 to agree on a common core-questionnaire that was fielded during 2002 
and 2003 in 15 countries. A total of 18 parties agreed to be part of the project. Details of 
the fieldwork are documented in Appendix 1.  
 
To our knowledge, no survey of party members has tried to measure support for grassroots 
democracy.5  We thus had to develop our own instruments to reflect the state of the 
discourses on grassroots  democracy in the early 2000s. The danger we faced was that 
indicators of grassroots democracy could be culturally tied to specific national contexts. 
Poguntke in his discXVVLRQRIWKHSULQFLSOHVRIµ%DVLVGHPRNUDWLH¶LQWKH*HUPDQ*UHHQV
gives a long list of very different elements of party organisation (Poguntke 1993, pp. 136-
171), some of which are closely tied to the specifics of the German political culture. At the 
other extreme, attitudes to abstract theoretical principles as discussed by political theorists 
(e.g. Doherty and de Geus 1996) do not lend themselves easily to survey research.  
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After detailed discussions,6 the research group decided on a number of questions aiming to 
confront members with statements that established important principles but were specific 
enough to elicit responses also from those not familiar with abstract green principles. In 
order to create the dependent variable, we concentrated on four elements that are closely 
related to key elements defining grassroots democracy within a comparative context, as 
recently outlined by Rihoux (2016).  
 
First, the LVVXHRIFROOHFWLYHOHDGHUVKLSKDGEHHQDQHOHPHQWRIKLJKµV\PEROLF¶LPSRUWDQFH
to many parties that sought to emphasize a break with traditional party politics. Most green 
SDUWLHVWKXVVWDUWHGRXWUHMHFWLQJWKHLGHDRIWKHSDUW\EHLQJµOHG¶E\DVLQJOHOeader, and 
opted for some form of collective leadership. However, by the early 2000s, some parties 
had adopted the concept of a single leader.  The first element of the dependent variable 
FRQVLVWVRQDWWLWXGHVWRZDUGVDµVLQJOHOHDGHU¶IRUGHWDLOVRQWKHconstruction of the 
dependent variable, see Appendix 2). 
 
In addition to the leadership issue, we developed ± and added to the dependent variable ± a 
battery of questions that included other measurements of grassroots democracy. These 
questions consisted on 1-5 agreement scales with a series of  statements. The key element 
of the green debates of the 1980s and 1990s had been to avoid the formation of a party 
elite, or at least limit its powers. Measures were thus discussed (and introduced in many 
cases) that imposed restrictions on what party elites could do.  
 
The first of these elements relates to term limits for party offices. Most green parties also 
included limitations to combine public and party offices, and this statement has been tested 
in the questionnaire. Finally,  elected representatives were also expected to contribute a 
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substantial part of their salary to party funds. 7 The wording of all questions used for the 
analysis is documented in Appendix 2 and the responses to the individual questions are 
documented in Appendix 3.  
 
The question we need to ask is whether these four principles derived from the international 
history of green party debates about key issue of party organisation, including the question 
RQDµVLQJOHOHDGHU¶DUHDFWXDOO\PHDVXUing the same latent phenomenon: grassroots 
democracy may be a concept known to academic students of green politics and long-term 
activists, but ordinary party members may not necessarily interpret questions about 
individual items of party organisation in that way. Also, there is the question whether 
grassroots democracy is essentially a unidimensional phenomenon.   
 
A number of tests were conducted to shed light on these questions. Factor analyses were 
conducted for the international dataset and each national study: they revealed little or no 
evidence of multi-dimensionality.  In most countries, the factor analysis only produced one 
YDOLGIDFWRUDVHFRQGIDFWRUIHOOMXVWEHORZWKHPDUJLQRIWKH(LJHQYDOXHFULWHULRQ,Q
only a handful of countries, this second factor just passed the margin of 1. All four 
variables are inter-correlated, although not quite as strongly and consistently as one might 
have expected. However, the case to form one scale for the measurement of attachment to 
grassroots democracy is essentially based on considerations of the substance of green 
politics: these four statements historically stand for key principles of grassroots democracy.  
The degree to which they all are representing the same principle by party members is a 
question to be explored.  
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A number of options were explored to construct a dependent variable combining all four 
elements. These included the construction of various additive indexes. In the end, the 
factor scores provided the best option.  Given the heterogeneity of the data, all multi-
variate analyses were run with different formats of the dependent variable, as well as on 
each question individually, but the results did not vary to any significant degree, 
suggesting that our results are robust.  
 
The operationalisation of individual-level variables follows well established procedures, 
but the definition of the party-level variable may require some explanation. In order to 
GLVWLQJXLVKGLIIHUHQWSDUWVRIWKHSDUW\µOLIHVSDQ¶DVLQVSLUHGE\WKHZRUNRI0RJHQV
Pedersen, green parties were allocated to four different groups according to their progress. 
Parties not having achieved parliamentary representation (at national level) were 
GLVWLQJXLVKHGIURPSDUWLHVWKDWKDGHQWHUHGSDUOLDPHQWEXWZHUHQRWFRQVLGHUHGµUHOHYDQW¶LQ
terms of government formation. A further GLVWLQFWLRQZDVPDGHEHWZHHQµUHOHYDQW¶parties 
that had not attained a role in national government and parties that had entered government 
coalitions at national level.  The effect of party lifespan position on grassroots democracy 
is to be examined with the help of a multi-level model.  
 
Of crucial importance was the inclusion of control variables.  For individual level 
predictors, we included age and gender.  Age here is particularly important as a control for 
historical social movement activity as older members would obviously had more 
opportunities to become involved in various social movement activities.  
 
The inclusion of control variables at the contextual level proved particularly challenging. 
Given the relatively small number of parties included (15), it was important to specify a 
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parsimonious model that would allow us to control effectively for the variation between 
countries while, at the same time, observe the relevant differences in our variables of 
interest. 8 Looking at the results on the cross-national differences in support for grassroots 
democracy (see Appendix 3), it became obvious that support was much higher in Southern 
European countries (Greece, Italy, Spain) but also in France and the French-speaking part 
of Belgium.  These parties were at very different stages in the party µOLIHVSDQ¶PRGHO
What, apart from representing µLatin Europe¶ (apart from Greece), do these countries have 
in common?  Looking at indicators such as trust in political parties, interpersonal trust, and 
also perception of corruption, there was a clear difference EHWZHHQ³/DWLQ´FRXQWULHVDQG
Greece on the one hand and Northern European countries on the other (European 
Commission 2002; ESS Round 1: European Social Survey Round 1 Data (2002); 
Transparency International 2002; Inglehart et al. 2004, p. A165). These differences also 
manifested themselves within countries:  trust in political parties was substantially higher 
among the Flemish speaking and lower among the French speaking population of Belgium. 
A detailed analysis of the historical development of organisational structures of green 
parties in Belgium suggests that, unlike members of their Flemish sister party, ECOLO 
members µVWLOOKDYHDWUDGLWLRQRIODFNRIFRQILGHQFHLQWKHLUUHSUHVHQWDWLYHVDQG
SURIHVVLRQDOV¶Buelens and Delwit 2008, p. 90). This is despite the fact that, historically, 
the Flemish Greens had a higher degree of involvement with social movements9, 
suggesting broader cultural differences may be responsible. 
  
The exact nature of the reasons why members of green parties in Latin Europe and Greece 
have a more positive attitude to grassroots democracy will require some further detailed 
analysis which goes beyond this paper. For our model, this raises two questions which we 
can answer: are the individual level predictors different for parties in Northern and 
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Southern Europe, and how does this factor impact on the relation between party lifespan 
position and attitudes to grassroots democracy?  In order to answer these questions, we 
thus decided to create a simple dummy variable, distinguishiQJEHWZHHQµ/DWLQ¶DQG*UHHN
countries on the one hand and Northern European countries on the other, to be used a 
control variable in the model. 
 
 
Results 
 
In order to test our hypotheses, we conducted a number of multivariate analyses whose 
results are displayed in Table 1.  The first model is a standard ordinary least square 
regression model which includes all independent variables at the individual level.  The 
second model presents the result of a multi-level analysis where we allow for varying 
intercepts by party, including the party-level type predictors.  
 
--- Table 1 about here --- 
 
The first important result concerns the influence of social movement activity. Our analysis 
suggests that social movement activities before and during the formation phase of green 
politics have no impact on attachment to grassroots democracy: those members who had 
been student, anti-nuclear and peace activists in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s were not more 
likely to support grassroots democracy than others. Given the strong historical link, this 
finding is perhaps surprising.  It appears that social movement experience does not have a 
sustained impact on the attitudes of participants, at least not as far as attitudes to grassroots 
democracy are concerned. H1 is thus not confirmed. 
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What did make a difference was the recent involvement in social movement activity that 
appeared to be most strongly related to support for grassroots democracy. Contemporary 
social movement activists who also joined green parties are thus more open to the idea of 
grassroots democracy, and thus H2 could be confirmed.  However, we need to be careful 
here in terms of inferring any direct of causal sequence.  In the absence of panel data, we 
cannot really distinguish whether green party members who support grassroots democracy 
are more likely to go out and also become active outside of party politics, or whether social 
movement activists bring preferences about internal organisation with them from the social 
movements into green parties.  
 
What can be said, however, is that a strong history of social movement activity does not 
translate into enduring preferences for grassroots democracy. This seems to suggest that 
the call for strong internal party democracy is maintained by continuous social movement 
engagement. A discontinuity of such engagement may thus make it more difficult for green 
party activists to maintain a strong focus on preserving the idea of grassroots democracy.  
 
Moving on to questions of ideology, here the coefficients clearly suggest that members 
placing them on the left of the left-right scale and those who have strong pacifist attitudes 
are more likely to be supportive of grassroots democracy. H3 and H4 can thus clearly be 
confirmed.  
 
Turning to questions of the effect of holding office in the party, our results provide at least 
partial confirmation for H5.  Holders of public office are less enthusiastic about grassroots 
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democracy. Holders of party offices have a tendency to go into the opposite direction, 
although the co-efficient is not significant.  
 
Overall, the individual level model broadly confirms our hypotheses: support for grassroots 
democracy is driven by left-wing, pacifist members who are currently active in social 
movements and do not hold a public office. The results are fairly robust as they apply 
across the board and across countries fairly consistently. The regression coefficients do not 
change fundamentally once party-level variables are included in the second, multi-level 
model.  
 
The two party-level variables that are part of the model are Latin/Greek political culture 
and political lifespan.  Support for grassroots democracy is clearly more widespread in 
Greece, Italy, Spain, France and the French-speaking parts of Belgium.  This divide is 
quite stark, and it cannot therefore surprise that this variable is a statistically significant 
predictor of support for grassroots democracy.  
 
This effect has to be seen together with the lifespan variable.  Contrasting parties that have 
entered parliament, have become a relevant force in the political system and have entered 
national coalition government with parties that have been not had much success and are 
still struggling to establish themselves shows that parties in the latter parts of the 
development tend to be less likely to support grassroots democracy. It is noteworthy that, 
at the bivariate level, it seemed that there is no statistically significant correlation here but 
once the preponderance of pro-democracy views within the French and Italian green 
parties that experienced government at the time of the survey is taking account of, the 
lifespan model seems to work, and H6 is thus confirmed.  
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---- Figure 1 about here --- 
 
In Figure 1, we plot the predicted values for different types of green parties along the 
various party µOLIHVSDQ¶SKDVHV. In order to estimate the uncertainty of the predictions, we 
rely on pseudo-Bayesian simulations, while keeping all the other variables at their means 
or modal categories.  What becomes clear here is that the difference between the attitudes 
of party members to grassroots democracy are not very strong at different development 
VWDJHV2QFHSDUWLHVHQWHUµPDLQVWUHDP¶SROLWLFVSUHIHUHQFHVFKDQJHEXWPRYLQJIXUWKHU
DKHDGRQWKHµOLIHVSDQ¶SDWKGRHVQRWDSSHDUWRKDYHDPDMRULPSDFW 
 
Conclusions 
 
Even after more than 20 years of green party development, the main forces behind 
demands for grassroots democracy in green parties are still the same:  it is the social 
movement oriented, pacifist membership identifying with the political Left that is pushing 
for grassroots democracy.  However, we found no evidence that past involvement in social 
movements that were of key importance to green parties in their formative phase, such as 
the student, anti-nuclear and peace movements, is positively associated with support for 
grassroots democracy.  Support for grassroots democracy in green parties does not involve 
JUHHQµROGLHV¶KDUNLQJEDFNWRWKHJRRGROGWLPHVRIVRFLDOPRYHPHQWSROLWLFV:hat makes 
a contribution is current involvement in protest politics.  Social movements thus continue 
to play a role in influencing the organisational agenda in green politics. 
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We have to be careful, of course, about the direction of any causal links claimed. The 
history of green parties sees social movement activities preceding green party formation. 
We thus can be fairly confident that key social movement experiences, particularly in the 
1960s and 1970s, preceded green party activity, and thus we have a possible causal 
sequence here that starts with social movements and influences attitudes to grassroots 
democracy within green parties. As we found, there is actually no link between past social 
movement activity and support for grassroots democracy. For the 2000s, however, the 
nature of the causal sequence is not so clear.  It is possible that members engaged in social 
movement activities in the 2000s were drawn into the party, thus establishing a causal 
sequence starting with the social movement experience. On the other hand, it is equally 
possible that green party members holding certain views on internal party democracy were 
more likely to engage in social movement activities. In any case, the association of 
contemporary social movement activity and support for grassroots democracy does suggest 
that on-going social movement activity is an important element. This would suggest that 
support for grassroots democracy is thus likely to decline in the context of an absence of 
any strong social movement mobilisation, but that it may revive in the context of new 
social movements emerging. 
 
Equally, the association between pacifist beliefs and left-wing orientation and support for 
grassroots democracy suggests that changes in the ideological make-up of parties may have 
an important influence on attitudes to internal party democracy.  However, this does not 
necessarily suggest that all parties will follow the same development model.  Some green 
parties may move away from radical positions and adjust their internal structure 
accordingly. Other parties may be re-energised by new social movement involvement and 
move from more moderate to more left-wing positions. The contrasting recent 
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development of the English and German Greens provides a case in point. It will be 
interesting to examine attitudes to grassroots democracy over time to examine these 
questions further.  
 
$OVRWKHUHVXOWVRQWKHLQIOXHQFHRISDUW\µOLIHVSDQ¶RQDWWLWXGHVWRJUDVVURRWVGHPRFUDF\
GRHVQRWIXOO\VXSSRUWWKHQRWLRQRIDVLPSOHGHYHORSPHQWSDWKIURPµPRYHPHQW¶WR
µQRUPDO¶SDUWLHV*UHHQSDUties do not abandon all notions of grassroots democracy once 
they enter parliament or become part of national government.  Our results suggest that 
while members of µRXWVLGHU¶SDUWLHVQRWDEOHWRHQWHUSDUOLDPHQWDUHVRPHZKDWPRUHOLNHO\
to embrace grassroots democracy, there is very little difference between further steps on 
the lifespan model.  Other forces must be at work here.  Looking at the strength of support 
for grassroots democracy across countries, a clear North-South divide is apparent, with 
members of green parties in µ/DWLQ Europe¶DQG*UHHFH displaying rather more support for 
grassroots democracy irrespective of their SDUW\¶VGHYHORSPHQWSKDVH. The exact reasons 
for this finding are somewhat unclear.  Some of these countries, in particular Greece, 
Spain, Italy and France, have a well-developed protest culture which may more readily 
feed into green parties¶ ideas associated with grassroots democracy. Another element 
which might be worth exploring is the influence of anarchist thinking.  Preferences for 
participatory democracy in general could, indeed, be seen primarily as part of the anarchist 
political philosophy (Barber 1984).  Anarchist thinking has historically had a strong 
influence in left-wing political discourses in some European countries, for example in 
Spain, France and Italy. Apart from the influence of social movements, different traditions 
of left-wing politics might thus have an influence here on cross-national differences in the 
attitudes of green party members.  
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Looking forward, what are the implications of our findings for the future research agenda? 
First, the question of grassroots democracy still is of topical importance.  Looking at 
developments since the early 2000s, green parties clearly display a continued commitment 
to grassroots democracy (Rihoux 2016). Green parties thus maintain organisational 
structures that display some continuing commitment to the values of the party formation 
phase. :KDWLVUHTXLUHGWKRXJKLVWRDQDO\VHSDUW\PHPEHUV¶DWWLWXGHVQRWRQO\LQDcross-
national but also cross-temporal setting to come to a better understanding of the drivers of 
support and rejection of principles of grassroots democracy over time.  
 
Second, while tKHJUHHQµPRGHO¶RIJUDVVURRWVGHPRFUDF\ endures as part of the green 
party project, it does not appear to have been adopted by any other party family, and thus 
the wider green project of changing the nature of party politics more widely has clearly 
failed (Rihoux and Frankland 2008, p. 284). Green parties are, however, facing a new 
challenge to their philosophy of internal party democracy from other parties in the shape of 
plebiscitary elements of internal party organisation. Poguntke et al. (2016) make a 
distinction between µDVVHPEO\EDVHGLQWUD-SDUW\GHPRFUDF\¶$,'3DQG µSOHELVFLWDU\
intra-SDUW\GHPRFUDF\¶3,3'7KHJUHHQSDUW\PRGHOFOHDUO\ILWVWKH$,'3PRGHO
According to their cross-national analysis of party constitutions, green parties come out 
rather well on the AIPD score which is higher than that of all other party families. 
However, in terms of their PIPD score, green parties are merely average and have a lower 
score than Social Democratic and Liberal parties (Poguntke et al. 2016, p. 672).  It will be 
one of the challenges for green parties how their self-perception as parties with a very high 
level of intra-party democracy can be reconciled with their apparent reluctance to embrace 
the introduction of plebiscitary forms of decision making. The attitudes of members here 
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might be quite important, and it would be interesting to see what drives attitudes of green 
SDUW\PHPEHUVWRµSOHELVFLWDU\¶PHDVXUHV 
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Figure 1: 
 
 
Table 1: Multi-level model of Support for Grassroots Democracy 
 
Predictors     Model 1   Model 2 
      (Cross-sectional) (Multi-level) 
 
Individual-level Variables 
 
Social Movements 
Involvement in social movements  0.01   0.00  
1960s-1990s     (0.00)   (0.00)  
 
Involvment in social movements 
2000s      0.09***  0.04** 
      (0.01)   (0.01)  
 
 
Ideology    
Left-wing     0.11***  0.09*** 
      (0.01)   (0.01)  
 
Pacifist     0.19***  0.13*** 
      (0.01)   (0.01)  
 
 
Party Socialisation 
 
Party office holder    0.04   0.05  
      (0.03)   (0.03)  
 
Public office holder    -0.08*   -0.08* 
      (0.04)   (0.03)  
 
Demographics 
Age      0.01***  0.01*** 
      (0.00)   (0.00)  
 
Gender (female)    0.01   0.12*** 
      (0.03)   (0.02)  
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Party Level Predictors 
 
Latin/Greek political culture    -  0.80*** 
          (0.10) 
 
Party Lifespan 
(Reference: Party without Parliamentary 
 Representation) 
  Party with Parliamentary  -   -0.34* 
  Representation -   -  (0.15) 
           
  Relevant Parliamentary  -   -0.16 
  Party    -   - (0.14) 
           
  Party in National Government - - - -0.32*** 
          (0.13) 
 
 
Intercept `  -  -1.97***  -1.46*** 
       (0.08)   (0.13)  
 
 
 
R2    -  0.15   - 
BIC      14335.01  13558.16 
Log Likelihood    -   -6714.78 
Number of groups: Party   -   15 
 
N      5292   5292   
 
--- 
Tests of statistical significance:  *** p<0.001; ** p< 0.01; * p<0.05 
 Appendix 1: Green Party Membership Survey 2002-2003 
 
Country  Party     Total  Questionnaires Valid Responses Response 
        Membership Mailed      Rate (Gross) 
                % 
 
Australia  NSW Greens      2400  2400     806   33.6 
Austria  Die Grünen      1714  1714     572   33.4 
Belgium  AGALEV      6000    500     279   55.8 
   ECOLO      4000    500     265   53.0 
Finland  Vihreä Liitto      1650    825     397   48.1 
France   Les Verts      9000  3000   1209   40.3 
Germany  %QGQLVµ'LH*UQHQ  45000  2201   1085   49.3 
Greece   ȅȚțȠȜܟȖȠȚ ȆȡܗıȚȞȠȚ       129    129       31   24.0 
Italy   Federazione dei Verdi   20000    999     291   29.1 
Ireland   Green Party/Comhaontas Glas     650    650     294   45.2 
Netherlands  GroenLinks    15000    500     251   50.2 
New Zealand  Green Party of Aotearoa    4067  1000     520   52.0 
Norway  De Grønne        500    500     186   37.2 
Spain   Los Verdes de Andalucia      400    400       73   18.3 
   Els Verds del Pais Valencia      100    100       38   38.0 
Sweden  Miljöpartiet De Gröna    8000    500     255   51.0 
UK    Green Party of England & Wales   4000  2334   1297   55.6 
   Scottish Green Party       517    517     260   50.3 
 
TOTAL       123,160  18,769   8,109   43.2 
Appendix 2: Question Wordings 
 
Dependent Variable 
 
Q. Here are a number of organisational principles that some have associated with the concept of 
µJUDVVURRWVGHPRFUDF\¶To what extent do you agree or disagree that these principles should be adopted 
(or retained) by the Green Party?  
(Strongly disagree, Disagree, Neither agree or disagree, Agree or Strongly Agree, 1- 5) 
 
No individual members should be able to retain a national party office for more than three years 
consecutively.  
 
Green members of parliament should not be able to hold any party office.  
 
Green members of parliament should only be allowed to earn up to the average national wage, 
the rest of their income should be donated to the party.  
 
 
 
Q. µ(VWDEOLVKHG¶SROLWLFDOSDUWLHVQRUPDOO\KDYH21(OHDGHU'R\RXWKLQNWKH*UHHQ3DUW\VKRXOGKDYH  
one leader? Yes / No 
 
'HSHQGHQW9DULDEOH)DFWRUVFRUHVRIWKHVHIRXUVWDWHPHQWVÃOHDGHUVKLSYDULDEOHUHFRFHG<HV
5 No 
 
 
Independent Variables 
 
Social Movements 
 
Q. Below is a list of various social movements. Have you ever been active in any of them (e.g. taken part 
in demonstrations, organised meetings etc)? If yes, please indicate in which decades you have been active.  
 
(Never active, or active in:  1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, 2000s) 
 
Student Movement 
Environmental Movement 
Animal Rights Movement 
Anti-nuclear (energy) Movement 
Peace Movement 
Feminist Movement 
Gay and Lesbian Rights Movement 
Labour/Trade Union Movement 
Third World Solidarity Movement 
Anti-Globalisation Movement 
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Ideology 
 
Q.  In politics people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you place the following 
political parties on the scale below where 0 is the most left-wing position and 10 is the most 
right-wing? And where would you place YOURSELF on the scale below? 
 
Scale 0 Left 0 10 Right (recoded 0 Right to 10 Left) 
 
 
Q. How much do you agree or disagree with each of these statements?  
(Strongly disagree, Disagree, Neither agree or disagree, Agree or Strongly Agree, 1- 5) 
 
War is always wrong 
 
 
Party Socialisation 
 
Q. Do you currently hold any office within the party (e.g. local party spokesperson) or any 
public office representing the party (e.g. local councillor)?  
- Party office  Yes/No 
- Public office Yes/No 
 
Demographics 
 
Q. In which year were you born?  
(Recoded as Age:  Year of survey ± year of birth) 
 
Q. Are you male or female? Male/Female 
 
 
Party Lifespan 
 
1 Not represented in National Parliament  - De Grønne (Norway), ȅȚțȠȜંȖȠȚ Ȇȡ੺ıȚȞȠȚ 
(Greece); Green Party of England & Wales, Scottish Green Party 
2 Represented in National Parliament - Green Party -Comhaontas Glas (Republic of Ireland), 
Els Verds del Pais Valencia (Spain), Los Verdes de Andalucia (Spain) 
³5HOHYDQW´3DUW\5HSUHVHQWHGLQ3DUOLDPHQWEXWQRWLQ*RYHUQPHQW± GroenLinks (The 
Netherland), Miljöpartiet - De Gröna (Sweden), Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 
4 In Government at national level - Bündnis '90 / Die Grünen (Germany), AGALEV and 
ECOLO (Belgium), Les Verts (France), Federazione dei Verdi (Italy), Vihreä Liitto (Finland) 
 
 
Latin/Greek 
 
0 De Grønne (Norway), Green Party of England & Wales, Scottish Green Party, Comhaontas 
Glas (Republic of Ireland), GroenLinks (The Netherlands), Miljöpartiet - De Gröna (Sweden), 
Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand, Bündnis '90 / Die Grünen (Germany), AGALEV 
(Belgium), Vihreä Liitto (Finland) 
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1 ȅȚțȠȜંȖȠȚ Ȇȡ੺ıȚȞȠȚ (Greece), Els Verds del Pais Valencia (Spain), Los Verdes de Andalucia 
(Spain), ECOLO (Belgium), Les Verts (France), Federazione dei Verdi (Italy) 
Appendix 3,QGLFDWRUVRI
*UDVVURRWV'HPRFUDF\
$JUHHRU6WURQJO\$JUHHDQG³1R´WRD6LQJOH3DUW\/HDGHU 
 
Country 
 
Party Term limits 
of 3 years 
Incompatibility of 
party and public 
office 
3DUOLDPHQWDULDQV¶
income should be 
limited 
Opposition 
to Single 
Party Leader 
Grassroots Democracy index 
(factor scores) 
N (valid) 
Mean Std. Dev. 
 
Belgium AGALEV 
 
13 29 20 20 
-0.43 0.73 261 
Belgium ECOLO 
 
55 54 36 85 0.61 0.9 252 
Finland Vihreä Liitto  28 20 33 15 
-0.38 0.84 382 
France Les Verts 
 
64 51 44 78 0.77 0.88 1123 
Germany Bündnis '90 / 
Die Grünen 
15 34 22 63 
-0.51 1.06 1052 
Greece ȅȚțȠȜܟȖȠȚ 
ȆȡܗıȚȞȠȚ 
65 57 69 100 0.99 0.86 28 
Italy Federazione 
dei Verdi 
51 44 48 47 0.39 0.91 280 
New 
Zealand 
Green Party 
of Aotearoa 
New Zealand  
13 33 15 90 
-0.13 0.7 488 
Norway De Grønne 
 
26 41 44 45 0.04 0.89 175 
Republic of 
Ireland 
Green Party -
Comhaontas 
Glas 
42 25 26 18 
-0.22 0.88 275 
Spain Els Verds del 
Pais 
Valencia 
53 60 49 67 0.57 1.01 34 
Spain Los Verdes 
de Andalucia 
39 57 42 38 0.29 0.96 72 
Sweden Miljöpartiet - 
De Gröna 
22 23 26 55 
-0.28 0.93 224 
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The 
Netherlands 
GroenLinks 18 75 22 18 
-0.14 0.67 237 
UK Green Party 
of England & 
Wales**   
30 20 28 48 
-0.11 0.85 988** 
UK Scottish 
Green Party 
31 23 30 45 
-0.18 0.87 230 
ALL***  37 39 27 50 0.005 1.00 6101 
** Weighted to account for different sub-samples 
*** Weighted according to party size (total membership) 
 
 
 
  
Appendix 4: Robustness Checks 
 
The first robustness check consisted in bivariate models using each of the individual level 
variables. The results from Table A1 show that all variables are correlated with the dependent 
variable. 
 
Table A1: Bivariate models of Grassroots Democracy (OLS ± individual level) 
 
 
Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Model 
3 
Model 
4 
Model 
5 Model 6 
Model 
7 
Model 
8 
(Intercept) -0.16*** 
-
0.17*** 
-
1.11*** 
-
0.93*** -0.00 0.02 
-
0.27*** -0.03 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.02) 
Involvement in 
social movements 0.04
***
 
       
1960s-1990s (0.00) 
       
Involvment in 
social movements 
2000s  
0.12*** 
      
  
(0.01) 
      
Left-wing 
  
0.15*** 
     
   
(0.01) 
     
Pacifist 
   
0.23*** 
    
    
(0.01) 
    
Party Office 
holder     0.07
*
 
   
     
(0.03) 
   
Public office 
holder      -0.06   
      
(0.04) 
  
Age 
      
0.01*** 
 
       
(0.00) 
 
Gender (Female) 
       
0.08** 
 
       
(0.03) 
R2 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 
Adj. R2 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 
Num. obs. 6151 6151 5698 5974 5921 5921 6103 6101 
RMSE 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.96 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01,*p < 0.05 
 
 
We also tested the relationship by country (not only by party), allowing the intercept to vary by 
country. As we can see in Table A2, the results do not vary significantly. Furthermore, Figure 
A1 shows the varying intercepts show some significant differences, all in the expected 
direction 
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Table A2: Model using varying intercepts by party 
 
 
Model 1 
(Intercept) -1.49*** 
 
(0.14) 
Involvement in social movements 0.00 
1960s-1990s (0.00) 
Involvment in social movements 
2000s 0.04
***
 
 
(0.01) 
Left-wing 0.09*** 
 
(0.01) 
Pacifist 0.13*** 
 
(0.01) 
Party Office holder 0.05 
 
(0.03) 
Public office holder -0.08* 
 
(0.03) 
Age 0.00** 
 
(0.00) 
Gender (Female) 0.12*** 
 
(0.02) 
Latin/Greek political culture 0.95*** 
 
(0.07) 
Party with Parliamentary Representation  -0.35* 
 
(0.17) 
Relevant Parliamentary Party -0.13 
 
(0.15) 
Party in National Government -0.37** 
 
(0.14) 
BIC 13559.54 
Log Likelihood -6715.46 
Num. obs. 5292 
Num. groups: country 13 
Var: country (Intercept) 0.03 
Var: Residual 0.73 
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A1: Varying intercepts by country 
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Finally, our last robustness check consisted in using the same model but with an additive scale 
as dependent variable. Our choice of factor analysis is mostly based on theory, but we show 
that our results hold even when we do not allow each item to load in a different way (Table 
A3). 
 
Table A3: Model using the additive scale as dependent variable 
 
 
Model 1 
(Intercept) 2.66*** 
 
(0.61) 
Involvement in social movements 0.04** 
1960s-1990s (0.01) 
Involvment in social movements 
2000s 0.15
***
 
 
(0.03) 
Left-wing 0.35*** 
 
(0.03) 
Pacifist 0.45*** 
 
(0.04) 
Party Office holder 0.19 
 
(0.11) 
Public office holder -0.17 
 
(0.12) 
Age 0.00 
 
(0.00) 
Gender (Female) 0.48*** 
 
(0.09) 
Latin/Greek political culture 3.17*** 
 
(0.53) 
Party with Parliamentary Representation  -2.03** 
 
(0.77) 
Relevant Parliamentary Party -0.46 
 
(0.73) 
Party in National Government -1.47* 
 
(0.64) 
AIC 26899.42 
BIC 26998.03 
Log Likelihood -13434.71 
Num. obs. 5292 
Num. groups: party 15 
Var: party (Intercept) 0.70 
Var: Residual 9.27 
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05 
 NOTES 
                                                 
1
 We are grateful to E. Gene Frankland and Robert Johns for comments on a previous version of this paper. All 
shortcomings remain our own responsibility, of course. 
2
 7KHSURMHFWµ(XURSHDQ*UHHQ3DUW\0HPEHUV¶VHWRXWWRFROOHFWGDWDRQJUHHQSDUW\ members across Western 
(XURSHXVLQJDµFRPPRQFRUHTXHVWLRQQDLUH¶PDLOHGWRUDQGRPVDPSOHVRIPHPEHUVGXULQJDQG,WZDV
funded by the British Academy under its Large Research Grant programme (LRG-31746) and directed by 
Wolfgang Rüdig (University of Strathclyde). Additional support was provided by the Research Development Fund 
of the University of Strathclyde. The financial support of the British Academy and the University of Strathclyde is 
gratefully acknowledged.  
Individual national surveys were carried out under the responsibility of the following researchers, often with 
additional financial support from their home institutions: Australia: Ariadne Vromen (University of Sydney); 
Austria: Wolfgang C. Müller (University of Mannheim); Belgium (AGALEV): Jo Buelens (Free University 
Brussels);Belgium (ECOLO): Benoît Rihoux (Catholic University of Louvain); Finland: Jukka Paastela 
(University of Tampere); France: Daniel Boy (CEVIPOF, Paris) and Benoît Rihoux (Catholic University of 
Louvain); Germany: Wolfgang Rüdig (University of Strathclyde); Greece: Iosif Botetzagias (Technological 
Institute of the Ionian Islands5HSXEOLFRI,UHODQG-RKQ*DUU\4XHHQ¶V8QLYHUVLW\%HOIDVW,WDO\5REHUWR
Biorcio (Bicocca University, Milan); the Netherlands (Groen-Links): Paul Lucardie and Wijbrandt van Schuur 
(University of Groningen); New Zealand: Tim Bale (Sussex University); Norway: Gunnar Grendstad (University 
of Bergen); Spain: Luis Ramiro (University of Murcia); Sweden: Anders Widfeldt (University of Aberdeen); UK 
(England &Wales): Wolfgang Rüdig (University of Strathclyde); UK (Scotland): Lynn Bennie (University of 
Aberdeen). 
3
 We also considered alternative variables. Many analyses of the development of green parties relied on Ronald 
,QJOHKDUW¶VWKHRU\RISost-materialist value change (Inglehart 1977, 1990).  The fact that most green parties did not 
VLPSO\OLPLWWKHPVHOYHVWRDQHQYLURQPHQWDODJHQGDEXWHVSRXVHGDIDUODUJHUDJHQGDRIµ1HZ/HIW¶LVVXHVZDVDNH\
LQGLFDWRURIWKHLUµSRVW-PDWHULDOLVW¶QDWXUHthe adherence to grass-roots democracy was one aspect of their post-
PDWHULDOLVWµ1HZ3ROLWLFV¶FKDUDFWHU3RJXQWNHSDQGWKXVµSRVW-PDWHULDOLVWV¶FRXOGEHH[SHFWHGWREHPRUH
sympathetic to grassroots democracy. A further possible approach is WKHLGHDRIWKHµQHZHQYLURQPHQWDOSDUDGLJP¶
(NEP) first formulated by Riley Dunlap and Kent van Liere (1978).  The basic idea is that ecologists have embraced a 
radically new ideology that is essentially characterised by a rejection of the dominant industrial paradigm. By extension, 
greens as representatives of the ecological movement could be expected to be associated with this new paradigm, and 
thus members scoring highly on NEP measurements could expected to support grassroots democracy.  
We excluded both variables on empirical as well as theoretical grounds.  The theory of post-materialist value change 
was originally developed to explain the up-rise of student movements in the 1960s: while there are clear links between 
this phenomenon and green parties, the key elements of the post-materialism theory are not specifically geared towards 
the key green political identities. The theory essentially assumes that the key demands of greens on environmental and 
RWKHUSROLF\LVVXHVDUHVXEVHUYLHQWWRWKHLUDOOHJHGPDLQLGHQWLW\XQGHUVWRRGWRFHQWUHDURXQGµSost-PDWHULDOLVW¶YDOXHV
/RZHDQG5GLJ5GLJ7KHWKHRU\RIWKHµQHZHQYLURQPHQWDOSDUDGLJP¶ also was developed in response 
WRDQHDUOLHUGHEDWHQDPHO\WKHULVHRIWKHµDQWL-JURZWK¶HFRORJ\PRYHPHQWRIWKHODWHVDQGHDUO\V7KH
strong focus of the theory on the question of growth might have been crucial in the early 1970s but had arguably lost its 
identity-giving character by the late 1970s/early 1980s.  
The alternative was to rely on variables that focus specifically on the key green identities as understood by greens at the 
time of party formation.  Perhaps the most important issues in most countries were nuclear power and nuclear weapons, 
and thus a strong anti-nuclear and pacifist orientation could be central to green identity.  Empirically, post-materialism 
and NEP were predictors of support for grassroots democracy but their effect was quite minor, and thus we decided to 
remove both variables from the final model. 
4
 The project is fully documented, with access to all questionnaires used, at the project website 
http://www.egpm.eu  
5
 One important sWXG\WRXFKLQJRQUHODWHGLVVXHVLV.LWVFKHOW¶VDQDO\VLVRI%HOJLDQJUHHQSDUW\PHPEHUV¶
perception of the importance of various obstacles to achieving internal party democracy as proposed by Michels 
(Kitschelt 1990).   
6
 Unfortunately, the funding available only covered the cost of fielding one round of questionnaires: there was thus 
no possibility to discuss specific question wordings with party activists and conduct pre-tests in each country. 
However, all members of the team were experienced researchers with a long record of research on green parties in 
their respective countries.  The involvement of the leading country experts on green party politics should thus 
provide some insurance that questions posed were not inappropriate in a specific national context.  
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7
 Questions asking member about their attitudes to the three issues were to be used in all national surveys but were not 
fielded in Australia and only one question was included in the Austrian questionnaire.  Australia and Austria are thus 
not part of the multi-variate analysis presented here.  
8
 Among the variables we considered was party size as smaller parties might be expected to be more open to 
internal party democracy (cf. Tan 1998). We also considered the effect of parties having adopted certain measures 
RIJUDVVURRWVGHPRFUDF\RUQRW,QSDUWLFXODUWKHLVVXHRIµFROOHFWLYHOHDGHUVKLS¶ZDVLPSRUWDQWKHUHDVVRPHJUHHQ
parties, namely in Finland, Italy, the Netherlands, the Republic of Ireland, and Spain (Andalucia), had in 2002 
DGRSWHGµVLQJOHOHDGHUV¶,QWKHJUHHQSDUW\RI)ODQGHUVUHQDPHG*URHQDGRSWHGWKHµVLQJOHOHDGHU¶FRQFHSW
(Buelens and Delwit 2008, p. 88), followed in 2007 by the Green Party of England & Wales (Rüdig 2008, p. 214). 
At the bivariate level, we do find that support for grassroots democracy is higher among parties with a smaller 
PHPEHUVKLSDQGWKDWVXSSRUWIRUµVLQJOHOHDGHUV¶LVKLJKHULQSDUWLHVWKDWKDYHDGRSWHGVLQJOHOHDGHUV+RZHYHU
we decided not to include these variables as a way to ensure parsimonious modelling. Furthermore, most of the 
unobserved variation between parties should be controlled for by using varying intercepts.  
9
 The only previous systematic comparison of attitudes of AGALEV and ECOLO members conducted by Herbert 
Kitschelt focuses on the LQIOXHQFHRIµFOHDYDJHPRELOLVDWLRQ¶.LWVFKHOWIRXQGWKDW$*$/(9KDGPRUH
µLGHRORJXHV¶DVWKHUHZDVDKLJKHUGHJUHHRIVRFLDOPRYHPHQWPRELOLVDWLRQLQ)ODQGHUVWKDQLQ:DOORQLD.LWVFKHOW
and Hellemans 1990, p. 195) which in turn was seen as the reason wh\$*$/(9PHPEHUVEODPHGµSDUW\OHDGHUV¶
for the lack of internal party democracy to a much higher degree than ECOLO members (Kitschelt 1990, p. 104). 
7KHWKHRU\RIµFOHDYDJHPRELOLVDWLRQ¶ZRXOGVXJJHVWWKDWVXSSRUWIRUJUDVVURRWVGHPRFUDF\VKRXOGEHKLJKHU 
among AGALEV members, but by 2002, the relative position of AGALEV and ECOLO members appear to be 
reversed, and ECOLO members are clearly more supportive of key elements of grassroots democracy.  
